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Abstract—This work considers covert communications in the
context of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) networks, aiming
to hide a UAV for transmitting critical information out of
an area that is monitored and where communication is not
allowed. Specifically, the UAV as a transmitter intends to transmit
information to a legitimate receiver (Bob) covertly while avoiding
being detected by a warden (Willie), where location uncertainty
exists at Bob and/or Willie. In order to enhance the considered
covert communication performance, we jointly optimize the
UAV’s trajectory and transmit power in terms of maximizing the
average covert transmission rate from the UAV to Bob subject
to transmission outage constraint and covertness constraint. The
formulated optimization problem is difficult to tackle directly
due to the intractable constraints. As such, we first employ
conservative approximation to transform a constraint into a
deterministic form and then apply the first-order restrictive
approximation to transform the optimization problem into a
convex form. By applying the successive convex approximation
(SCA) technique, an efficient iterative algorithm is developed
to solve the optimization problem. Our examination shows that
the developed joint trajectory and transmit power optimization
scheme achieves significantly better covert communication per-
formance as compared to a benchmark scheme.
Index Terms—Covert communication, UAV networks, trajec-
tory optimization, transmit power, location uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been ex-
tensively used in wireless communication networks, due to
their controllable mobility, on-demand deployment, and line-
of-sight (LoS) air-to-ground link (e.g., [1]). For example, a
UAV can be used as an airborne wireless communication
platform such as mobile base station (BS) to rapidly recover
communication service or to enhance communication quality
(e.g., [2]–[6]). It can also be utilized as a mobile relay to
provide a wireless connection between two or more remote
users without the need for a reliable direct communication link
(e.g., [7]–[9]). Furthermore, a UAV can conduct mobile data
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collection or information dissemination to assist with various
Internet of Things (IoT) applications (e.g., [10], [11]).
In the aforementioned UAV applications, wireless com-
munication security is of increasing concerns due to the
broadcast nature of wireless channels. The LoS air-to-ground
link in the UAV networks makes the confidential messages
transmitted by a UAV being easier to be intercepted by illegal
eavesdroppers on the ground. Against this background, several
recent works addressed wireless communication security in
the context of the UAV networks (e.g., [12]–[17]). In general,
the security performance of UAV networks can be improved
by adjusting the UAV’s flight trajectory and transmit power to
simultaneously increase the channel quality of legitimate links
and degrade the channel quality of eavesdropping links. For
example, in [12], a UAV communicates with a ground user
and prevents the confidential messages from being intercepted
by the eavesdropper via optimizing its flight trajectory and
transmit power. Meanwhile, a UAV-enabled mobile jammer
was considered in [13], [14] to enhance wireless communi-
cation security in the context of UAV networks, where the
friendly UAV jammer was employed to transmit artificial noise
(AN) to improve the communication security. In [15], the
authors considered a scenario of dual UAVs, where one UAV
transmitted the confidential messages to ground users and the
other UAV transmitted AN to interfere with the eavesdroppers.
The secure communication in a mobile relay network was
considered in [16], where a UAV acted as a mobile relay
to enhance physical layer security by dynamically adjusting
its location and transmit power. Furthermore, a caching UAV
assisted secure transmission in hyper-dense networks based on
interference alignment was investigated in [17], where UAVs
were employed to provide data traffic to users, aiming to
reduce the transmission pressure of small-cell base stations.
The aforementioned works in the context of UAV network
security only focused on preventing the confidential infor-
mation from being intercepted by an eavesdropper. However,
hiding the wireless transmission of a UAV or the UAV itself
has been overlooked, which is a critical issue in the context
of UAV networks. For example, in military applications once
the enemy detects the transmission behavior of a UAV (such
that to detect the UAV itself), it may cause the UAV’s
location information to be exposed, which makes the UAV
vulnerable to attack. Fortunately, we find that the emerging
covert communication technology can meet the requirement
of hiding the UAV’s transmission or the UAV itself, since
in covert communications a transmitter intends to transmit
information to a receiver covertly in order to avoid this
2transmission being detected by a warden [18]–[24]. In the
context of covert communications, the authors of [18] proved
that transmitting more than O(√n) bits would result in the
warden’s detection error probability approaching zero. Mean-
while, [19] showed that the transmitter can covertly transmit
O(n) bits to the receiver when the warden does not exactly
know its noise power. In addition to noise power uncertainty,
the impact of uninformed jammers on covert communications
was examined in [20], where a positive covert rate was
proved to be achievable. Furthermore, covert communications
with a poisson field of interferers and within one-way relay
networks were investigated in [21] and [22], respectively. Most
recently, the impact a finite number of channel uses on covert
communications over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels was considered in [24], where the authors first proved
that the optimal actual number of channel uses is the maximum
available number of channel uses and then the authors verified
that the uniformly distributed random transmit power can be
used to further enhance the covert communication performance
in delay-constrained application scenarios. We note that the
aforementioned works on covert communications all focused
on static scenarios, i.e., the transmitter, the receiver, and the
warden are fixed at specific locations, which severely limits the
applications of covert communications, especially in military
scenarios.
In order to address the UAV communication covertness
(with the ultimate goal of hiding a UAV) and to extend the
application scenarios of covert communications, in this work,
we consider covert communications in the context of UAV
networks as shown in Fig. 1, where the transmitter Alice
(UAV) as a mobile transmitter intends to communicate with the
ground receiver Bob covertly, while the ground warden Willie
wants to detect the UAV’s wireless transmission. We note that
the UAV as a mobile transmitter can significantly extend the
transmission range of covert communications, which is espe-
cially useful for military air-to-ground covert communications,
while the traditional static scenario for covert communications
serves as a special case of this dynamic scenario. Our goal is
to maximize the covert transmission rate from the UAV to the
legitimate ground user via optimizing the UAV’s trajectory
and transmit power, which is a new design framework that
jointly considers the average covert transmission rate (ACTR)
and the average minimum total error rate at Willie. The main
contributions of this work are summarized as below.
• For the first time, we consider a UAV as the transmitter
Alice (a mobile transmitter) in the context of covert
communications, aiming to extend the applications of
covert communications from static scenarios to dynamic
ones. In addition, we study a practical setup, where the
locations of both the legitimate receiver Bob and the
warden Willie are subject to uncertainties. This leads to
the fact that the distances from the UAV to both Bob
and Willie are random variables following noncentral
chi-square distributions, which (as we proved) can be
well approximated by Gaussian distributions. Based on
this approximation, we derive a lower bound on the
average minimum total error rate over Willie’s location
Willie Bob
Alice
Fig. 1. Covert communications in the context of UAV networks.
uncertainty from the perspective of UAV, which enables
us to analyze the covert communication performance in
the considered scenario.
• In order to jointly design the UAV’s trajectory and
transmit power, we formulate an optimization problem
that maximizes the ACTR subject to the transmission
outage probability constraint at Bob and covertness con-
straint at Willie as well as the UAV’s mobility constraint
and transmit power constraint. Such a joint optimization
problem is generally difficult to tackle directly due to
the non-convex constraints. To solve this optimization
problem, we first transform the intractable transmission
outage probability constraint into a deterministic form by
using the conservative approximation and then we apply
the first-order restrictive approximation to transform the
optimization problem into a convex form, which is math-
ematically tractable.
• We employ the successive convex approximation (SCA)
algorithm to solve the achieved convex optimization prob-
lem iteratively and present a method that generates initial
feasible solutions, which outputs the UAV’s trajectory and
transmit power for covert communications in the consid-
ered scenario. Our examination shows that the proposed
joint trajectory and transmit power optimization scheme
achieves significant covert communication performance
gain relative to a benchmark scheme. Interestingly, our
examination also shows that, with regard to the UAV’s
trajectory, it prefers to hover around Bob for a certain
period and, surprisingly, it moves closer to Willie as the
covertness becomes stricter.
The reminder of this work is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the considered system model. In Section
III, we derive the minimum total error rate at Willie and
average minimum total error rate at Willie from the perspective
of the UAV. In Section IV, we joint design the trajectory
and transmit power of the UAV to maximize the ACTR.
Section V provides our numerical results to examine the covert
communication performance of the proposed scheme relative
to the benchmark scheme and Section VI draws conclusion
remarks.
Notation: Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters repre-
sent vectors and matrices, respectively, AT , AH , and A  0
denote transpose, conjugate transpose, and semidefiniteness of
matrix A, respectively. Ex[·], Tr(·), ‖ · ‖, and | · | denote the
statistical expectation of x, trace, Euclidean norm, and absolute
3value, respectively. Pr{·} and x˙(t) denote the probability of
an event and the derivative with respect to t, respectively.
N(0, σ2) denotes the Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance σ2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Scenario and Adopted Assumptions
As shown in Fig. 1, in this work we consider covert
communications in the context of UAV networks, in which
Bob and Willie are located on the ground, while Alice as a
UAV aims to covertly communicate with Bob without being
detected by Willie. We assume that each of UAV, Bob, and
Willie is equipped with a single antenna. Without loss of
generality, we use a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate
system to indicate the location information of each transceiver.
As such, we denote the horizontal location of Bob and Willie
by qb , [xb, yb]T ∈ R2×1 and qw , [xw, yw]T ∈ R2×1,
respectively. We assume that UAV flies at a fixed altitude
above the ground, denoted by H , which can be considered as
the minimum altitude to avoid collision with ground obstacles.
The flight period and the maximum flying speed of the UAV
are set as T and Vmax, respectively. We note that the takeoff
and the landing locations of the UAV are usually a priori given
according to its specific task. We denote qa,0 , [xa,0, ya,0]T
and qa,F , [xa,F , ya,F ]T as the initial and final locations of
UAV, respectively. At time instant t, the horizontal coordinate
of the UAV is denoted as qa(t) , [xa(t), ya(t)]T ∈ R2×1,
where 0 ≤ t ≤ T . As such, we have the initial and final loca-
tion constraints as given by qa(0) = qa,0 and qa(T ) = qa,F ,
while the flying speed constraint is given by q˙a(t) ≤ Vmax,
0 ≤ t ≤ T , where q˙a(t) denotes the instantaneous velocity of
UAV, which is the time-derivative of q(t).
In UAV networks, continuous time t implies an infinite
number of speed constraints, which makes the trajectory
design being too hard to tackle. Therefore, we equally divide
the flight period T into N time slots. The period of each time
slot δt =
T
N
is set to be sufficiently small such that the location
of the UAV is considered to be approximately unchanged
within each time slot. As such, UAV’s flight trajectory can
be expressed as qa[n] , [xa[n], ya[n]]T ∈ R2×1, and n =
{1, · · · , N} , N . We note that infinitesimal δt can accurately
approximate the continuous flight trajectory of UAV. However,
it also leads to high computational complexity. Therefore, the
time slot δt should be properly chosen to balance between the
approximation accuracy and the computational complexity in
UAV networks [5]. The maximum flying distance of UAV at
each time slot, denoted by L, can be expressed as Vmaxδt.
According to the above description, we write the mobility
constraint on UAV as
‖qa[n+ 1]− qa[n]‖ ≤ L, n ∈ N \ {N}, (1a)
‖qa[1]− qa,0‖ ≤ L, qa[N ] = qa,F . (1b)
We use Pa[n] to denote the transmit power of the UAV at the
n-th time slot, while P¯a,max and Pa,max denote the maximum
average transmit power and peak transmit power of UAV,
respectively. Thus, the average and the peak transmit power
constraints at UAV are given by
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pa[n] ≤ P¯a,max, (2a)
0 ≤ Pa[n] ≤ Pa,max, ∀n, (2b)
respectively. We note that the maximum average transmit
power P¯a,max is to keep the long-term power budget of the
communication related power.
B. Channel Model
It is assumed that the channels from UAV to Bob and to
Willie are all dominated by LoS components [5]. As such,
UAV has to estimate the locations of Willie and Bob in order
to determine the corresponding channels. In practice, location
estimation suffers from estimation errors. In this work, we
assume that the UAV knows the potential regions in which
Willie is located while the exact location of Willie is unknown,
i.e., Willie’s location is assumed to be known by UAV with
some uncertainty (e.g., localization errors). This assumption
can be justified through the following two aspects. Firstly, the
UAV can use a camera or radar to detect suspicious areas
where Willie may exist, which was clarified in [13]. Secondly,
this assumption can be justified by considering the scenarios
where Willie was a licensed user who had legal access to
the UAV networks (and thus the UAV knows his imperfect
location information based on his previous communications
with the UAV networks), but the UAV suspects Willie as a
malicious user for the current transmission to Bob (i.e., the
UAV intends to hide the transmission to Bob from Willie).
We note that similar scenarios have been widely considered
in the literature of physical layer security (e.g., [25], [26]). In
addition, a widely used Gaussian error model is used model
the location errors of Bob and Willie, which leads to that the
location coordinates of Bob and Willie are given as
xb = xˆb +∆xb, yb = yˆb +∆yb, (3a)
xw = xˆw +∆xw, yw = yˆw +∆yw, (3b)
where qˆb , [xˆb, yˆb]T ∈ R2×1 and qˆw , [xˆw, yˆw]T ∈ R2×1
are estimated horizontal coordinates of Bob and Willie, re-
spectively, while eb , [∆xb,∆yb]T ∈ R2×1 and ew ,
[∆xw,∆yw]
T ∈ R2×1 are the estimation errors on the lo-
cations of Bob and Willie, respectively. We note that ∆xb
and ∆yb are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Gaussian random variables, each of which follows N(0, ε2b),
i.e., eb ∼ N(0, ε2bI2). Meanwhile, each of ∆xw and ∆yw
follows N(0, ε2w), i.e., ew ∼ N(0, ε2wI2). Following (3), at the
n-th time slot, the channel power gain from UAV to Bob and
from UAV to Willie are given by
|hab[n]|2 = β0‖qa[n]− qˆb − eb‖2 +H2 , ∀n, (4a)
|haw[n]|2 = β0‖qa[n]− qˆw − ew‖2 +H2 , ∀n, (4b)
respectively, where β0 denotes the channel power gain at the
reference distance 1 m.
4C. Binary Hypothesis Testing at Willie
In covert communications, Willie has to decide whether
UAV transmitted to Bob. We note that, since UAV flies over
the area above Willie, i.e., Willie can directly observe UAV’s
flight trajectory, it is reasonable to assume that the Willie has
the perfect knowledge of UAV’s location information. This
also can be justified by the fact that this is the best-case
scenario for Wille (i.e., the worst-case scenario for covert
communications). As such, for the i-th channel use in the n-th
time slot, the received signal at Willie is given by
yiw[n] =
{
nw(i), H0,√
β0Pa[n]
‖qa[n]−qw‖2+H2
x(i) + nw(i), H1,
(5)
where H0 denotes the null hypothesis in which UAV did not
transmit, and H1 denotes the alternative hypothesis where
UAV did transmit to Bob. x(i), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, represents
the signal transmitted by UAV, satisfying E[x(i)x(i)∗] = 1,
where m is the total number of channel uses in the n-th time
slot. yiw[n] denotes the received signal at Willie for the i-th
channel use, and nw(i) is the AWGN at Willie with variance
σ2w. We note that the transmit power Pa[n] is considered as
fixed within each time slot, but may change from one time
slot to another time slot.
At the n-th time slot, the optimal decision rule for Willie
that minimizes the total error rate is given by [24]
Tw[n] ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
|yiw[n]|2
D1
R
D0
Pth[n], (6)
where Tw[n] and Pth[n] are the average power of each received
symbol at Willie and the detection threshold at the n-th time
slot, respectively, whileD0 andD1 are the decisions in favor of
H0 and H1, respectively. In this work, we consider an infinite
number of channel uses in each time slot, i.e., m → ∞,
which can be justified as follows. Firstly, to balance the
approximate accuracy and computational complexity, δt can
be chosen such that Vmaxδt
H
≤ κ, where κ is a given threshold
to control the approximation accuracy [5], [27]. Following this
consideration, we can increase the flying altitude H or reduce
the maximum flying speed Vmax to appropriately increase
the duration of the time slot δt. Secondly, we recall that the
number of symbols transmitted in each time slot is directly
related to the communication bandwidth, i.e., the larger the
communication bandwidth is, the more symbols the UAV
can transmit within each time slot. Following the above two
aspects, we can make the number of channel uses in each time
slot large enough to be approximated as infinite by choosing
appropriate communication bandwidth, flying altitude H , and
the maximum flying speed Vmax. We note that this assumption
(i.e., an infinite number of channel uses in each time slot) has
also been widely used in the literature of UAV networks (e.g.,
[5], [6], [12], [13]). Thus, following (5) and (6), Tw[n] can be
rewritten as
Tw[n] =
{
σ2w, H0,
β0Pa[n]
‖qa[n]−qw‖2+H2
+ σ2w, H1.
(7)
In practice, a transceiver may not exactly know its AWGN
power due to limited resources used to learn the dynamic
environment. As such, following [19], [28], in this work
we consider noise uncertainty, i.e., σ2w is a random vari-
able with a known distribution. Specifically, we assume that
σ2w,dB ∈ [σˇ2dB − ̺dB, σˇ2dB + ̺dB], follows a uniform dis-
tribution within its value range in the dB domain, where
σ2w,dB = 10 log10 (σ
2
w), σˇ
2
dB = 10 log10 (σˇ
2), σˇ2 denotes the
nominal noise power, ̺dB = 10 log10 (̺) is a parameter that
measures the size of noise uncertainty, and ̺ ≥ 1. Then, the
distribution of σ2w is given by
fσ2w(x) =
{
1
2 ln (̺)x , if
1
̺
σˇ2 ≤ x ≤ ̺σˇ2,
0, otherwise.
(8)
In this work, we denote the false alarm rate and the miss
detection rate at the n-th time slot by PF [n] , Pr{D1|H0}
and PM [n] , Pr{D0|H1}, respectively, which can be written
as
PF [n] = Pr{σ2w ≥ Pth[n]}, (9)
PM [n] = Pr
{ β0Pa[n]
‖qa[n]− qw‖2 +H2 + σ
2
w ≤ Pth[n]
}
, (10)
respectively, ∀n. Then, the total error rate at the n-th time slot
is given by
ξ[n] = PF [n] + PM [n], ∀n. (11)
In covert communications, Willie wish to minimize the total
error rate ξ[n], ∀n. In the following, we first derive the optimal
detection threshold P ∗th[n] from the perspective of Willie in
order to achieve the minimum total error rate ξ∗[n], and then
we design the trajectory and the transmit power of UAV to
ensure the average minimum total error rate being no less
than a specific value, i.e., ξ¯∗[n] ≥ 1 − ρw, where ξ¯∗[n] is
achieved by averaging ξ∗[n] over the priori distribution of
Willie’s location estimation error ew and ρw is an arbitrarily
small value determining the required covertness.
III. DETECTION PERFORMANCE
In this section, we first present Willie’s false alarm rate and
miss detection rate, based on which we obtain the optimal
detection threshold P ∗th[n] that minimizes the total error rate.
Then, we derive the average total error rate at Willie from the
perspective of UAV.
A. Detection Performance at Willie
According to (9) and (10), at the n-th time slot, the false
alarm and miss detection rates at Willie are given by
PF [n] =


1, Pth[n] <
σˇ2
̺
,
τ1[n],
σˇ2
̺
≤ Pth[n] ≤ ̺σˇ2,
0, Pth[n] > ̺σˇ
2,
(12)
PM [n] =


0, Pth[n] < Ew[n] +
σˇ2
̺
,
τ2[n], Ew[n] +
σˇ2
̺
≤ Pth[n] ≤ Ew[n] + ̺σˇ2,
1, Pth[n] > Ew[n] + ̺σˇ
2,
(13)
5where Ew[n] , β0Pa[n]‖qa[n]−qw‖2+H2 , and
τ1[n] ,
∫ ̺σˇ2
Pth[n]
1
2 ln (̺)x
dx =
1
2 ln (̺)
ln
(
̺σˇ2
Pth[n]
)
, (14)
τ2[n] ,
∫ Pth [n]−Ew[n]
σˇ2
̺
1
2 ln (̺)x
dx =
ln
(
̺(Pth[n]−Ew[n])
σˇ2
)
2 ln (̺)
.
(15)
In the following lemma, we derive the optimal detection
threshold P ∗th[n], ∀n, to minimize the total error rate ξ[n] at
Willie. We note that if Ew[n] +
σˇ2
̺
≥ ̺σˇ2, Willie can set
Pth[n] = ̺σˇ
2 to ensure ξ[n] = 0, which implies that Willie
can detect any covert communication without any error. As
such, in the following, we focus the case with Ew[n] +
σˇ2
̺
<
̺σˇ2.
Lemma 1: The optimal detection threshold P ∗th[n], which
minimizes ξ[n] at Willie, is Ew[n]+
σˇ2
̺
and the corresponding
minimum total error rate is given by
ξ∗[n] =
1
2 ln (̺)
ln

 ̺σˇ2
β0Pa[n]
‖qa[n]−qw‖2+H2
+ σˇ
2
̺

. (16)
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
B. Detection Performance from UAV’s Point of View
In the last subsection, under the assumption that Willie can
obtain UAV’s perfect location information, we derived Willie’s
optimal detection threshold and the minimum total error rate.
However, from UAV’s point of view, it is difficult to obtain
the exact location information of Willie, since Willie may
be hidden somewhere on the ground, which motivate us to
consider the location uncertainty at Willie from the perspective
of UAV. As such, in the following, we derive the average total
error rate over the Willie’s uncertain locations as the measure
on Willie’s detection performance from UAV’s point of view.
To this end, we first introduce a random variable
X [n] ,
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw − ew‖2, ∀n, (17)
which is the term ‖qa[n] − qw‖2 in (16) with location
uncertainty at Willie, i.e., qw = qˆw + ew. In the following
lemma we derive the distribution of X [n].
Lemma 2: The probability density function (pdf) of X [n]
is given by
fX[n](x) =
{
1
2e
− 12 (x+λ[n])
∑∞
k=0
(λ[n]4 )
kxk
k!k! , x ≥ 0,
0, x < 0,
(18)
where λ[n] is given by
λ[n] ,
1
ε2w
(
(xa[n]− xˆw)2 + (ya[n]− yˆw)2
)
, ∀n. (19)
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
From Lemma 2, we know that X [n] follows noncentral
chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom [29]. The
expectation and variance of the X [n] are given by λ[n]+2 and
4λ[n]+4, respectively, where λ[n] is the noncentral parameter.
Following the total error rate ξ∗[n] given in (16) and
Lemma 2, the average minimum total error rate over Willie’s
location uncertainty is given by
ξ¯∗[n] =
∫ ∞
0
1
2 ln (̺)
ln

 ̺σˇ
2
β0
ε2w
Pa[n]
x+H
2
ε2w
+ σˇ
2
̺

fX[n](x)dx
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
1
2 ln (̺)
ln
(
1 +
β1Pa[n]
x+ H
2
ε2w
)
fX[n](x)dx,
= 1− EX[n]
[
1
2 ln (̺)
ln
(
1 +
β1Pa[n]
X [n] + H
2
ε2w
)]
= 1− 1
2 ln (̺)
EX[n] [g(X [n])] , (20)
where β1 , β0̺ε2wσˇ2 and g(X [n]) , ln
(
1 + β1Pa[n]
X[n]+H
2
ε2w
)
. We note
that g(X [n]) is a convex function with respect to X [n].
Since the pdf of X [n] is very complex (as shown in
Lemma 2) and X [n] is in the denominator of the logarithmic
function, an exact analytical expression of (20) is mathemat-
ically intractable. In the context of covert communication, it
is required ξ¯∗[n] ≥ 1− ρw, ∀n, for an arbitrarily small ρw, in
order to guarantee the covertness of UAV’s transmission. Con-
sidering the intractable expression of ξ¯∗[n] and the required
covertness constraint ξ¯∗[n] ≥ 1 − ρw, in the following we
derive a lower bound on ξ¯∗[n]. To this end, we first present the
following lemma to derive an upper bound on EX[n] [g(X [n])].
Lemma 3: If f(x) is a convex function with respect to the
variable x ∈ [a, b] with µx and σ2x as the expectation and
variance of x, respectively, we have
Ex[f(x)] ≤ p1f(a) + p2f(µx) + p3f(b), (21)
where p1 , θ2(µx−a) , p2 , 1 − θ2(µx−a) − θ2(b−µx) , p3 ,
θ
2(b−µx)
, and θ , E(|x − µx|) denotes the mean absolute
deviation of x. As b→∞, (21) can be written as
Ex[f(x)] ≤ f(µx)+ θ
2
(
lim
t→∞
f(t)
t
+
f(a)− f(µx)
µx − a
)
. (22)
When x ∼ N(µx, σ2x), we have θ =
√
2
π
σx.
Proof: The detailed proof is presented in [30], [31].
To use Lemma 3 for determining a lower bound on the min-
imum detection error rate ξ¯∗[n], we next show that the random
variable X [n] of interest can be precisely approximated as a
Gaussian random variable in the considered scenario. To this
end, we first present the following lemma.
Lemma 4: For a noncentral chi-square random variable
V =
∑k
i=1 v
2
i with η as the noncentral parameter, its pdf
can be precisely approximated as the Gaussian distribution
N(k + η, 2k + 4η), even when the degree of freedom k is
relatively small.
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix C.
Following Lemma 2, we know that λ[n] given (19) is
the noncentral parameter of X [n]. We note that the value
of λ[n] is mainly determined by the distance from UAV to
Willie’s estimated location, which is normally large in covert
6communications to ensure the required covertness. As such, we
can conclude that λ[n] is usually very large. Then, following
Lemma 4, the pdf of X [n] given in Lemma 2 can be approx-
imated as N(2 + λ[n], 4 + 4λ[n]). Then, following Lemma 3
and Lemma 4, we determine a lower bound on the minimum
detection error rate ξ¯∗[n] in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: A lower bound on the average minimum total
error rate ξ¯∗[n] is given by
ξˇ∗[n] ≤ ξ¯∗[n], (23)
where
ξˇ∗[n] = 1− 1
2 ln (̺)
gu(λ[n], Pa[n]), (24)
gu(λ[n], Pa[n])=ln
(
1+
β1Pa[n]
λ[n]+2+H
2
ε2w
)
+
√
2√
π
√
λ[n] + 1
×
(
ln
(
1+
β1ε
2
wPa[n]
H2
)
−ln
(
1+
β1Pa[n]
λ[n]+2+H
2
ε2w
))
. (25)
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix D.
Following Proposition 1 and recalling that the original
covertness constraint is ξ¯∗[n] ≥ 1 − ρw, in the following
sections we use ξˇ∗[n] ≥ 1 − ρw as our covertness constraint
in our considered optimization problems.
IV. JOINT OPTIMIZATION OF UAV’S TRAJECTORY AND
TRANSMIT POWER FOR COVERT COMMUNICATIONS
In this section, we aim to design the trajectory and transmit
power of UAV to maximize the transmission rate from UAV
to Bob subject to a transmission outage constraint and the
aforementioned covertness constraint.
A. Optimization Problem Formulation
Considering location uncertainty, the transmission from
UAV to Bob may occur outage. In practice, many wireless
communication systems can tolerate a certain transmission
outage probability that does not significantly affect the desired
quality of service (QoS). As such, in this work we require
this transmission outage probability being greater than or
equal to a specific value, which serves as a constraint in
the optimization of the UAV’s trajectory and transmit power.
Considering the UAV’s mobility constraint, power constraint,
and the covertness constraint, the optimization problem at the
UAV is formulated as
(P1) : max
Qa,Pa,Rb
1
N
N∑
n=1
Rb[n] (26a)
s.t. Pr
{
log2
(
1 +
Pa[n]γ0
‖qa[n]− qˆb − eb‖2 +H2
)
≥ Rb[n]
}
≥ 1− ρb, ∀n, (26b)
ξˇ∗[n] ≥ 1− ρw, (26c)
(1), (26d)
(2), (26e)
where Qa , {qa[n], ∀n}, Pa , {Pa[n], ∀n}, Rb ,
{Rb[n], ∀n}, and ρb is the maximum allowable transmission
outage probability from UAV to Bob. We note that, γ0 in
(26b) is defined as β0
σ2
b
, where σ2b is the power of the AWGN
at Bob. The objective function given in (26a) is the aver-
age transmission rate over the N time slots of interest and
maximizing it means to maximize the total amount of the
transmitted information from UAV to Bob over the N time
slots. The transmission outage probability constraint (26b)
ensures a certain required QoS between UAV and Bob. In
addition, the constraint (26c) is to ensure the covertness of the
transmission from UAV to Bob. Furthermore, the constraint
(26d) detailed in (1) is the mobility constraint on the UAV,
while the constraint (26e) detailed in (2) serves as the transmit
power constraint at the UAV.
We note that the objective function is a linear function
of Rb[n], ∀n, while the mobility constraint (26d) and the
power constraint (26e) are convex with respect to qa[n]
and Pa[n], respectively. However, the transmission outage
probability constraint (26b) and covertness constraint (26c) are
non-convex. As such, the optimization problem (P1) is difficult
to tackle directly. Therefore, in the following we develop an
algorithm to solve it step by step.
B. On the Constraints of the Optimization Problem (P1)
The main challenge to solve the optimization problem
(P1) arises from the intractable expression for the outage
probability involved in the constraint (26b) and the complex
expression for the minimum average total error rate involved
in the constraint (26c). In the following, we aim to tackle the
non-convex constraints (26b) and (26c), respectively, in order
to facilitate solving (P1).
1) Transmission Outage Probability Constraint (26b): We
note that it is difficult to directly derive the analytical expres-
sion for the outage probability in (26b). Fortunately, we find
that the Bernstein-type inequality (BTI) [32] can transform this
constraint into a deterministic form. To proceed, we present
the BTI in the following lemma.
Lemma 5: If A ∈ CN×N is a Hermitian matrix, x ∼
CN (0, I), w ∈ CN×1, ρ ∈ (0, 1], and c ∈ R is independent
of x, the following implication holds:
Pr
{
xHAx+ 2R
{
xHw
}
+ c ≥ 0
}
≥ 1− ρ. (27)
⇐


Tr(A) −√−2 ln ρz + ln ρy + c ≥ 0,∥∥∥∥∥vec(A)√2w
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ z
yIN +A  0,
(28)
where y and z are slack variables.
Proof: The detailed proof can be found in [32].
In order to apply the BTI, we first rewrite the outage
constraint (26b) as
Pr
{
‖qa[n]−qˆb−eb‖2 ≤ Pa[n]γ0
2Rb[n] − 1−H
2
}
≥ 1− ρb, ∀n.
(29)
7Recall that eb ∼ N(0, ε2bI2). As such, we have eb = εbu,
where u ∼ N(0, I2). Consequently, (29) can be rewritten as
Pr
{
− ε2buTu+ 2εbuT (qa[n]− qˆb)− qTa [n]qa[n] (30)
+ 2qTa [n]qˆb − qˆTb qˆb +
Pa[n]γ0
2Rb[n] − 1 −H
2 ≥ 0
}
≥ 1−ρb, ∀n.
We observe that, the constraint (30) is in a similar form as
(27). As such, following Lemma 5 and (30), we have
Tr
(−ε2bI2)−√−2 ln ρbz1[n] + ln ρby1[n]− qTa [n]qa[n]
+ 2qTa [n]qˆb − qˆTb qˆb +
Pa[n]γ0
2Rb[n] − 1 −H
2 ≥ 0, ∀n, (31a)∥∥∥∥ vec
(−ε2bI2)√
2εb(qa[n]− qˆb)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ z1[n], ∀n, (31b)
y1[n]I2 − ε2bI2  0, y1[n] ≥ 0, z1[n] ≥ 0, ∀n, (31c)
where y1[n] and z1[n] are introduced slack variables. We note
that, (31c) can be further simplified as
y1[n] ≥ ε2b , z1[n] ≥ 0, ∀n. (32)
Replacing the outage constraint (26b) in (P1) with (31a),
(31b) and (32), the optimization problem (P1) can be rewritten
as
(P1.1) : max
Qa,Pa,Rb,Y1,Z1
1
N
N∑
n=1
Rb[n]
s.t. (31a), (31b), (32), (26c), (1), (2), (33)
where Y1 , {y1[n], ∀n} and Z1 , {z1[n], ∀n}. We note that
all the constraints in (P1.1) are in exact analytical expressions.
We also note that (31b) is a second-order cones (SOC)
constraint, and (32) is a linear constraint, both of which are
convex. However, (31a) is still non-convex due to the non-
concavity of the term
Pa[n]γ0
2Rb[n]−1
. In addition, the total error
rate constraint (26c) is also non-convex. In the following,
we apply the first-order restrictive approximation to transform
(P1.1) into a convex optimization problem and then using the
SCA algorithm to solve it. For now, we focus on transforming
(31a) into a convex constraint. We observe from (31a) that the
optimization variables Pa[n] and Rb[n] are coupled in the term
Pa[n]γ0
2Rb[n]−1
. To proceed with the transformation, we first present
the following lemma.
Lemma 6: If Rb[n] > 0, ∀n, then the following inequality
must hold
γ0Pa[n]
2Rb[n] − 1 ≥ g1
(
Pa[n], Rb[n], P˜a[n], R˜b[n]
)
, (34)
where
g1
(
Pa[n], Rb[n], P˜a[n], R˜b[n]
)
=
P˜a[n]γ0
2R˜b[n] − 1 −
(P˜a[n])
2γ0
(2R˜b[n] − 1)
×
(
1
Pa[n]
− 1
P˜a[n]
)
− P˜a[n]γ0(2
Rb[n] − 2R˜b[n])
(2R˜b[n] − 1)2 , (35)
while P˜a[n] and R˜b[n], ∀n, are given feasible points.
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix E.
We note that, for given feasible points (P˜a[n], R˜b[n]), ∀n,
g1
(
Pa[n], Rb[n], P˜a[n], R˜b[n]
)
is a concave function with
respect to the optimization variables Pa[n] and Rb[n]. As such,
the non-convex constraint (31a) can be rewritten as
Tr(−ε2bI2)−
√
−2 ln ρbz1[n]+ln ρby1[n]−qTa [n]qa[n]−qˆTb qˆb
+2qTa [n]qˆb+g1
(
Pa[n], Rb[n], P˜a[n], R˜b[n]
)
−H2≥0, (36)
∀n, which is convex. So far, we have transformed the non-
convex constraint (26b) into a convex form, which is detailed
in (31b), (32), and (36).
2) Covertness Constraint (26c): Following (24), we can
rewrite the constraint (26c) as
gu(λ[n], Pa[n]) ≤ 2 ln (̺)ρw, ∀n, (37)
where gu(λ[n], Pa[n]) is defined in (25). We note that the
expression of gu(λ[n], Pa[n]) is very complex and the opti-
mization variables Pa[n] and qa[n], ∀n, are coupled, which
leads to the fact that (26c) is hard to tackle. To proceed, we
first multiply
√
π
2
√
λ[n] + 1 on both sides of the constraint
(37), yielding(√
π
2
√
λ[n] + 1− 1
)
ln
(
1 +
β1Pa[n]
λ[n] + 2 + H
2
ε2w
)
+
ln
(
1 +
β1ε
2
wPa[n]
H2
)
≤
√
2π ln (̺)ρw
√
λ[n] + 1, (38)
∀n. We note that
(√
π
2
√
λ[n] + 1− 1
)
> 0 must hold, since
λ[n] defined in (19) must be nonnegative. Introducing the slack
variables u1[n] and u2[n], ∀n, (38) can be rewritten as(√
π
2
√
λ[n] + 1− 1
)√
u1[n]+
ln
(
1 +
β1ε
2
wPa[n]
H2
)
≤
√
2π ln (̺)ρw
√
u2[n], ∀n, (39a)
ln
(
1 +
β1Pa[n]
λ[n] + 2 + H
2
ε2w
)
≤
√
u1[n], ∀n, (39b)
λ[n] + 1 ≥ u2[n], ∀n. (39c)
We note that the equalities in (39a), (39b), and (39c) must
hold for the optimal solution. Otherwise, the objective function
can be further improved by adjusting the slack variables.
Although (39a), (39b), and (39c) are still non-convex, they
are all in tractable forms compared to (38). In the following,
we focus on transforming (39a), (39b), and (39c) into convex
constraints. We first rewrite the constraint (39a) as√
π
2
√(
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 + 1
)
u1[n]−
√
u1[n]+
ln
(
1 +
β1ε
2
wPa[n]
H2
)
≤
√
2π ln (̺)ρw
√
u2[n], ∀n. (40)
We note that the first term and the third term in the left
hand side (LHS) of (40) are non-convex. As such, in order
to transform (40) into a convex constraint, we first present the
following lemma.
Lemma 7: For u1[n] > 0, ∀n, the inequality (41) must hold,
which is shown at the top of the next page, where q˜a[n] and
u˜1[n], ∀n, are given feasible points.
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix F.
8√(
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 + 1
)
u1[n] ≤
√(
1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖2 + 1
)
u˜1[n] +
1
2
√
1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖2 + 1
u˜1[n]
(u1[n]− u˜1[n])+
1
2
√
u˜1[n]
1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖2 + 1
(
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 − 1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖2
)
, g2(qa[n], u1[n], q˜a[n], u˜1[n]), (41)
ln
(
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 + 2 + H
2
ε2w
+ β1Pa[n]
)
≤ ln
(
1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖2 + 2 + H
2
ε2w
+ β1P˜a[n]
)
+(
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 − 1ε2w ‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖
2
)
+ β1(Pa[n]− P˜a[n])
1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖2 + 2 + H2ε2w + β1P˜a[n]
, g4(qa[n], Pa[n], q˜a[n], P˜a[n]), ∀n. (46)
We recall that 1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 is a convex function with
respect to qa[n]. For given feasible points (q˜a[n], u˜1[n]), ∀n,
(41) is a linear function with respect to u1[n] and it is a convex
function with respect to qa[n]. As such, (41) is jointly convex
with respect to qa[n] and u1[n]. In addition, we observe that
ln
(
1 +
β1ε
2
wPa[n]
H2
)
in (40) is a concave function with respect
to Pa[n]. We note that the first-order approximation of any
concave function is its upper bound [33]. As such, for given
feasible points P˜a[n], ∀n, we have
ln
(
1 +
β1ε
2
wPa[n]
H2
)
≤ g3(Pa[n], P˜a[n]), ∀n, (42)
where
g3(Pa[n], P˜a[n]) =
ln
(
1 +
β1ε
2
wP˜a[n]
H2
)
+
β1ε
2
w(Pa[n]− P˜a[n])
H2 + β1ε2wP˜a[n]
, ∀n. (43)
We note that, for given feasible points P˜a[n], ∀n,
g3(Pa[n], P˜a[n]) is a linear function with respect to the
transmit power Pa[n]. As such, g3(Pa[n], P˜a[n]) is a convex
function with respect to Pa[n]. According to (41) and (42),
the restrictive approximation of (40) is given by√
π
2
g2(qa[n], u1[n], q˜a[n], u˜1[n])−
√
u1[n]+
g3(Pa[n], P˜a[n]) ≤
√
2π ln (̺)ρw
√
u2[n], ∀n. (44)
We note that the LHS of (44) is convex with respect to qa[n]
and u1[n]. Since
√
u2[n] is a concave function with respect
to u2[n], the right hand side (RHS) of (44) is concave with
respect to u2[n]. As such, we now have transformed the non-
convex constraint (39a) into a convex constraint given in (44).
In order to transform the constraint (39b) into a convex one,
we first rewrite it as
ln
(
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 + 2 + H
2
ε2w
+ β1Pa[n]
)
−
ln
(
u2[n] + 1 +
H2
ε2w
)
≤
√
u1[n], ∀n. (45)
We observe that the first term in the LHS of (45) is jointly
concave with respect to 1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 and Pa[n], and the
second term in the LHS of (45) is convex with respect to
u2[n]. This special form allows us to apply the first-order
approximation to transform (45) into a convex constraint.
Similar to (42), for given feasible points (q˜a[n], P˜a[n]), ∀n,
the first-order restrictive approximation of the first term in the
LHS of (45) is given by (46), which is shown at the top of this
page. We observe that, for given feasible points (qa[n], P˜a[n]),
∀n, (46) is a convex function with respect to qa[n] and Pa[n].
As such, the first-order restrictive approximation of (45) is
given by
g4(qa[n], Pa[n], q˜a[n], P˜a[n])−
ln
(
u2[n] + 1 +
H2
ε2w
)
≤
√
u1[n], ∀n, (47)
which is jointly convex with respect to qa[n], Pa[n], and u1[n].
Finally, we tackle the constraint (39c) in order to converge
it into a convex constraint. We note that (39c) is non-convex
due to the super-level set of the convex quadratic function
1
ε2w
‖qa[n] − qˆw‖2. We recall that any convex function is
lower bounded by its first-order approximation at any feasible
point [33]. As such, for given feasible points q˜a[n], ∀n, the
first-order lower bound of 1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 is given by
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 ≥ 2
ε2w
(q˜a[n]− qˆw)T (qa[n]− q˜a[n])+
1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖2 , g5(qa[n], q˜a[n]), ∀n. (48)
We note that (48) is a linear function with respect to the
optimization variable qa[n]. As such, for given feasible points
q˜a[n], ∀n, the first-order restrictive approximation of (39c) is
given by
g5(qa[n], q˜a[n]) + 1 ≥ u2[n], ∀n, (49)
which is convex.
So far, we have transformed the non-convex covertness
constraint (26c) into a convex form, which is detailed by
(44), (47), and (49). Following the above transformation, the
optimization problem (P1.1) can be reformulated as
(P1.2) : max
Qa,Pa,Rb,Y1,Z1,U1,U2
1
N
N∑
n=1
Rb[n]
s.t. (31b), (32), (36), (44), (47), (49), (1), (2), (50)
9Algorithm 1 SCA Algorithm for Solving Problem (P1.1)
1: Initialize: Given feasible (q˜0a[n], P˜
0
a [n], R˜
0
b [n], u˜
0
1[n]), ∀n;
i = 0.
2: repeat
3: Given a feasible (q˜ia[n], P˜
i
a[n], R˜
i
b[n], u˜
i
1[n]), ∀n, solve
problem (P1.2) and obtain the current optimal solution
(q˜∗a[n], P˜
∗
a [n], R˜
∗
b [n], u˜
∗
1[n]), ∀n; i = i+ 1.
4: Update the feasible points (q˜ia[n],P˜
i
a[n],R˜
i
b[n],u˜
i
1[n]) =
(q˜∗a[n], P˜
∗
a [n], R˜
∗
b [n], u˜
∗
1[n]), ∀n.
5: Compute objective value of (P1.1), denoted by R¯ib.
6: until |R¯ib − R¯i−1b | ≤ ǫ is met, where ǫ denotes the
convergence tolerance.
where U1 , {u1[n], ∀n} and U2 , {u2[n], ∀n}. In the
following subsection, we present the algorithm used to solve
the optimization problem (P1.2).
C. Overall Algorithm
The optimization problem (P1.2) is with a linear objec-
tive function and a convex constraint set. As such, it is
a convex optimization problem. For given feasible points
(q˜a[n], P˜a[n], R˜b[n], u˜1[n]), ∀n, the optimization problem
(P1.2) can be efficiently solved by convex optimization solver
such as CVX [33]. We note that the constraint set of (P1.2)
is more stricter than the constraint set of the original opti-
mization problem (P1.1). This leads to that the solution to
the optimization problem (P1.2) is also feasible to (P1.1).
We note that the two optimization problems are equivalent
at the given feasible points (q˜a[n], P˜a[n], R˜b[n], u˜1[n]), ∀n.
We also note that the objective value of (P1.1) can be further
improved by successively solving the optimization problem
(P1.2). According to the principle of SCA, at each iteration, the
current solution to the optimization problem (P1.2) gradually
approximates the solution to the optimization problem (P1.1)
convergely. The algorithm used to solve the optimization
problem (P1.1) is detailed in Algorithm 1.
We note that it is very critical to selection the initial fea-
sible solutions/points (q˜0a[n], P˜
0
a [n], R˜
0
b [n], u˜
0
1[n]), ∀n, which
directly determine the feasibility of the optimization problem
(P1.2) and the convergence speed of Algorithm 1. Practically,
we can generate the initial points randomly and then verify
their feasibility. If they are infeasible, we have to generate
them randomly again. However, for the optimization problem
(P1.2), the aforemetioned random method is not applicable,
since it is difficult to randomly generate a trajectory of the
UAV to satisfy the mobility constraint (1).
In order to achieve feasible initial points q˜0a[n], we de-
termine an initial trajectory for the UAV as follows. UAV
first flies to Bob from the initial location with the shortest
path and maximum speed, then UAV hovers above Bob’s
estimated location as long as possible for achieving a better
communication channel, and finally UAV flies to the final
location with the shortest path and maximum speed in order
to arrive at the final location by the end of the last time slot.
We note that if the flight period T is not sufficiently large
for the UAV to arrive at the location just above Bob and then
-500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400 500
xa (m)
60
90
120
150
180
210
240
270
300
330
y
a
(m
)
Initial location Final location
Bob Willie
T = 300 s
T = 210 s
T = 200 s
JTP
STP
Fig. 2. UAV’s trajectories for different values of the flight period T .
turn back to the final location, the UAV will turn at a certain
midway point and fly to the final location at the end of the last
time slot. We refer this initial trajectory as the ‘line-segment
trajectory’. This initial trajectory must satisfy the mobility
constraint (1). In addition, we can adjust the UAV’s transmit
power such that the initial trajectory satisfies the transmission
outage probability constraint and the covertness constraint. As
such, the generated initial trajectory must be a feasible solution
to the optimization problem (P1.2).
For the initial feasible points P˜ 0a [n] and R˜
0
b [n], ∀n, we
can obtain them by randomly generating a very small set of
values. Consequently, the initial feasible points of u˜01[n] can
be generated according to (39b), which is given by
u˜01[n] = ln
(
1 +
β1P˜a[n]
1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n]− qˆw‖2 + 2 + H2ε2w
)
, ∀n. (51)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate the
performance of the UAV’s covert communications achieved
by our developed algorithm. To demonstrate the benefit of the
joint optimization of the UAV’s trajectory and transmit power
(denoted as the JTP scheme), we compare it with a benchmark
scheme named as the STP scheme, where the UAV’s trajectory
is fixed and only its transmit power is optimized. Specifically,
in the STP scheme, we adopt the initial feasible trajectory
(i.e., the line-segment trajectory detailed in Section IV-D)
as its fixed trajectory and then optimize its transmit power
accordingly. Without other statements, the system parameters
are set as follows: P¯a = 20 dBm, Pa,max = 4P¯a,max, ε
2
b =
ε2w = 25, H = 100 m, Vmax = 5 m/s, qa,0 = [−500, 100]T ,
qa,F = [500, 100]
T , qˆw = [100, 300]
T , qˆb = [−100, 300]T ,
β0 = −60 dB, γ0 = 80 dB, δt = 1 s, ̺dB = 3, σˇ2dB = −120,
ρb = ρw = 0.05, and ǫ = 10
−4.
In Fig. 2, we plot the optimized trajectories of the UAV
achieved by our proposed JTP scheme and the benchmark
scheme (i.e., the STP scheme) with different values of the
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Fig. 3. The UAV’s transmit power and speed for different values of the flight
period T , where T = 300 s for (a) and (b), while T = 210 s for (c) and (d).
flight period T , where Bob’s estimated location, Willie’s
estimated location, the UAV’s initial location, and the UAV’s
final location are marked with ©, , +, and ×, respectively.
In this figure, as expected we first observe that the UAV’s
trajectories achieved by the JTP and STP schemes are identical
for T = 200 s. This is due to the fact that T = 200 s
is the minimum required time for the UAV to fly from its
initial location to its final location due to the maximum speed
constraint. However, the UAV’s trajectories achieved by these
two schemes gradually appear different from each other as T
increases. For example, for T = 300 s, in the JTP scheme
the UAV first flies to Bob with its maximum speed when
it is on the LHS of Bob, then hovers around at Bob for a
certain period, and finally chooses a certain path, which is
not the straight line from Bob to the UAV’s final location
but a curve avoiding the closet of Willie, to fly to its final
location with the maximum speed at the end of the last time
slot. This observation is confirmed by the flight speed of the
UAV, which is shown in Fig. 3(b). From this figure, we can
see that the above detailed trajectory is significantly different
from the line-segment trajectory used in the STP scheme.
Intuitively, the reasons why the UAV hovers around at Bob for
a certain period are given as below. When UAV flies from the
initial location to the final location, there must be an optimal
location that can achieve the maximum ACTR while satisfying
the covertness constraint. As such, UAV prefers to hover this
location in order to improve the ACTR when T is sufficiently
large. We also note that the hovering location is near the LHS
of Bob, which not only guarantees a better communication
channel but also makes the covertness constraint easier to
satisfy. As such, the hovering location is generally to strike
a tradeoff between the communication performance from the
UAV to Bob and average minimum total error rate at Willie.
As we confirmed numerically, this hovering location is the
UAV’s optimal location in the static scenario.
In Fig. 3, we plot the obtained UAV’s transmit power and
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Fig. 4. The trajectory of UAV and corresponding transmit power for different
ρw and Willie’s location uncertainty levels ε
2
w .
flight speed for different values of the flight period T . In
Fig. 3(a), we observe that the UAV’s transmit power achieved
by the JTP scheme is larger than that achieved by the STP
scheme. This is due to the fact that the UAV’s trajectory
achieved by the JTP scheme is always further away from
Willie than that achieved by the STP scheme. This allows
the UAV to transmit signals with a higher transmit power to
further improve the ACTR (average covert transmission rate)
in the JTP scheme, while ensuring the same level covertness
(guaranteeing the same level of detection error rate at Willie).
This is confirmed by Fig. 5. In Fig. 3(a), we also observe
that the UAV’s transmit power is in three different stages, i.e.,
rapid-decreasing stage, stable stage, and varying stage. This
exactly matches with the UAV’s flight trajectory as shown in
Fig. 2, i.e., the UAV varies its transmit power as per its location
in order to ensure a certain covertness. In Fig. 3(b), we can see
that the UAV’s speed at the balancing location is zero, which
means that the UAV stays static at this location for a certain
time period. In Fig. 3(d), we observe that the UAV always
flies at its maximum speed, which is due to the fact that the
flight period T is not sufficiently large for the UAV to arrive
at Bob’s location. This is the reason why the UAV’s transmit
power as shown in Fig. 3(c) first decreases and then increases.
In Fig. 4, we plot the UAV’s trajectory and transmit power
achieved by our JTP scheme for different values of the
covertness level parameter ρw and the location uncertainty
parameter ε2w. In Fig. 4(a), we observe that the distance
from the UAV’s trajectory (from the balancing location to the
final location) to Willie decreases as the covertness constraint
becomes stricter (i.e., ρw decreases in ξˇ
∗[n] ≥ 1 − ρw).
Intuitively, we may expect that the UAV’s trajectory should be
further away from Willie as the covertness constraint becomes
stricter, which is contradict to the above observation. This is
due to the fact that the UAV’s trajectory and its transmit power
are jointly optimized in the JTP scheme. Specifically, the
UAV’s transmit power has a larger impact on the considered
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Fig. 5. The maximum ACTRs (average covert transmission rates) achieved
by the JTP and STP schemes versus the flight period T for different noise
uncertainty levels (i.e., different values of ̺dB).
covert communications. As such, for ρw = 0.1, the UAV
may choose a trajectory that is further away from the Willie
relative to the case with ρw = 0.05, which allows the UAV to
transmit with a higher power. This explanation is confirmed
by the observation shown in Fig. 4(b), which shows that the
UAV’s transmit power for ρw = 0.1 is much larger than
that for ρw = 0.05. In Fig. 4(c) and Fig. 4(d), we observe
that the UAV’s flight trajectory moves away from Willie and
its transmit power increases, as Willie’s location uncertainty
decreases (i.e., ε2w decreases). We explain this observation by
considering a special case. Specifically, as ε2w → ∞, i.e., the
UAV does not know the location information of Willie, the
UAV will hover as long as possible around Bob with a small
transmit power to ensure the covertness constraint and chooses
the shortest path to fly from the hovering location to its final
location. As such, in the specific settings (Willie is on the RHS
of the path from Bob to the UAV’s final location), we have the
aforementioned observation that the UAV’s trajectory moves
away from Wille as ε2w decreases.
In Fig. 5, we plot the maximum ACTRs achieved by the
JTP and STP schemes versus the flight period T for different
levels of the noise uncertainty at Willie (i.e., different values
of ̺dB). In this figure, we first observe that the achieved
maximum ACTRs by the two schemes increase with T . This is
due to the fact that the covert transmission rates are relatively
large when the UAV is hovering around Bob and a larger T
allows the UAV to hover around Bob for a longer time. In this
figure, we also observe that the proposed JTP scheme always
achieves a higher maximum ACTR than the STP scheme,
which demonstrates that the joint optimization of the UAV’s
trajectory and transmit power is necessary for improving the
covert communication performance in the considered UAV
networks. Finally, as expected we observe that this maximum
ACTR increases as the noise uncertainty at Willie increases
(i.e., as ̺dB increases). This is due to the fact that a larger
̺dB makes it harder for Willie to make correct decisions in
0 25 50 75 100 125
ε2b
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
A
v
er
a
g
e
co
v
er
t
tr
a
n
sm
is
si
o
n
ra
te
(b
p
s/
H
z) JTP, ε
2
w = 25
JTP, ε2w = 50
JTP, ε2w = 100
STP, ε2w = 25
STP, ε2w = 50
STP, ε2w = 100
Fig. 6. The maximum ACTRs (average covert transmission rates) achieved
by the JTP and STP schemes versus the Bob’s location uncertainty parameter
ε2
b
for different values of Willie’s location uncertainty parameter ε2w .
the detection of the UAV’s covert transmission.
In Fig. 6, we plot the maximum ACTRs achieved by the
JTP and STP schemes versus Bob’s location uncertainty level
ε2b for different values of Willie’s location uncertainty ε
2
w. In
this figure, as expected we observe that the maximum ACTR
decreases as ε2b or ε
2
w increases, since a larger ε
2
b makes the
transmission outage constraint from the UAV to Bob harder to
be satisfied, while a larger ε2w makes the covertness constraint
more difficult to satisfy. This observation also shows that Bob
or Willie’s location uncertainty has a large impact on the
achieved maximum ACTR.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we jointly optimized the UAV’s trajectory
and transmit power for covert communications, in terms of
maximizing the ACTR (average covert transmission rate) from
the UAV to Bob subject to the transmission outage and
covertness constraints. The formulated optimization problem
serves as a new design framework to jointly consider the
transmission rate from the UAV to Bob and the detection
error rate at Willie, which have been transformed into convex
forms by utilizing first-order restrictive approximation in this
work. This allows us to develop an algorithm based on SCA to
solve the formulated optimization problem. Our examinations
showed that the developed joint optimization of the UAV’s
trajectory and transmit power achieves significantly better
covert communication performance relative to a benchmark
scheme. Interesting, we found that, with regard to the UAV’s
trajectory, it prefers to hover around Bob for a certain period
and, surprisingly, it moves closer to Willie as the covertness
becomes stricter.
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EX[n] [g(X [n])] ≤ g(λ[n] + 2) +
√
2
π
√
λ[n] + 1
(
lim
X[n]→∞
g(X [n])
X [n]
+
g(0)− g(λ[n] + 2)
λ[n] + 2
)
(60a)
= ln
(
1 +
β1Pa[n]
λ[n] + 2 + H
2
ε2w
)
+
√
2
π
√
λ[n] + 1
λ[n] + 2
(
ln
(
1 +
β1ε
2
wPa[n]
H2
)
− ln
(
1 +
β1Pa[n]
λ[n] + 2 + H
2
ε2w
))
(60b)
≤ ln
(
1+
β1Pa[n]
λ[n]+2+H
2
ε2w
)
+
√
2√
π
√
λ[n] + 1
(
ln
(
1+
β1ε
2
wPa[n]
H2
)
−ln
(
1 +
β1Pa[n]
λ[n]+2+H
2
ε2w
))
, gu(λ[n], Pa[n]). (60c)
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
As per (12) and (13), the total error rate ξ[n] at the n-th
time slot is given by
ξ[n] =


1, Pth[n] <
σˇ2
̺
,
τ1[n],
σˇ2
̺
≤ Pth[n] < Ew[n] + σˇ2̺ ,
τ1[n] + τ2[n], Ew[n] +
σˇ2
̺
≤ Pth[n] ≤ ̺σˇ2,
τ2[n], ̺σˇ
2 < Pth[n] ≤ Ew[n] + ̺σˇ2,
1, Pth[n] > Ew[n] + ̺σˇ
2,
(52)
where
τ1[n] =
1
2 ln (̺)
ln
(
̺σˇ2
Pth[n]
)
, τ2[n] =
ln
(
̺(Pth [n]−Ew[n])
σˇ2
)
2 ln (̺)
,
τ1[n] + τ2[n] =
1
2 ln (̺)
ln
(
̺2 − ̺
2Ew[n]
Pth[n]
)
. (53)
We first note that ξ[n] = 1 is the worst-case scenario
for Willie and thus Willie does not set Pth[n] <
σˇ2
̺
or
Pth[n] > Ew[n]+̺σˇ
2. We also oberve that ξ[n] monotonically
decreases with Pth[n] for
σˇ2
̺
≤ Pth[n] < Ew[n] + σˇ2̺ ,
while it is a monotonically increasing function of Pth[n] when
Ew[n]+
σˇ2
̺
≤ Pth[n] ≤ ̺σˇ2 and ̺σˇ2 < Pth[n] ≤ Ew[n]+̺σˇ2.
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that ξ[n] is a continuous
function of Pth[n] in (52). As such, we can conclude that the
optimal detection threshold is given by P ∗th[n] = Ew[n] +
σˇ2
̺
and the corresponding minimum total error rate is given by
ξ∗[n] = 12 ln (̺) ln
(
̺σˇ2
Ew[n]+
σˇ2
̺
)
. This completes the proof of
Lemma 1. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Following (17), the random variable X [n] can be written as
X [n]=
1
ε2w
[(xa[n]−xˆw−∆xw)2+(ya[n]−yˆw−∆yw)2].
(54)
As mentioned before, the Gaussian error model is adopted in
the considered scenario, where∆xw and∆yw follow the same
distribution N(0, ε2w). Then, we have
1
εw
(xa[n]− xˆw −∆xw) ∼ N(xa[n]− xˆw
εw
, 1), ∀n,
1
εw
(ya[n]− yˆw −∆yw) ∼ N(ya[n]− yˆw
εw
, 1), ∀n. (55)
For the random variable x =
∑v
i=1 x
2
i , where xi, i = 1, · · · , v,
are i.i.d. random variables with xi ∼ N(µi, 1), ∀i, x follows
the noncentral chi-square distribution with v degrees of free-
dom and with the noncentral parameter
∑v
i=1 µ
2
i . As such,
the random variable X [n] follows the noncentral chi-square
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom and with the noncentral
parameter λ[n], which is given by
λ[n] ,
1
ε2w
(
(xa[n]− xˆw)2 + (ya[n]− yˆw)2
)
, ∀n, (56)
and the expectation and variance of the X [n] are given by
λ[n]+2 and 4λ[n]+4, respectively. This completes the proof
of Lemma 2. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We note that vi ∼ N(µi, 1), i = 1, 2, · · · , k. For the random
variable V =
∑k
i=1 v
2
i , its noncentral parameter is given by
η =
∑k
i=1 µ
2
i . When k → ∞, we can achieve the result
in Lemma 4 by using the Central Limit Theorem. In the
following, we prove that Lemma 4 still holds for the case
where the degree of freedom k is small but the noncentral
parameter η is sufficiently large.
It can be observed from (18) that the pdf of a noncentral
chi-square random variable is only related to the noncentral
parameter η and is independent of individual mean µi, i =
1, 2, · · · , k. Following this observation, we introduce a random
variable S, which is defined as
S , (s1 +
√
η)
2
+
k∑
i=2
s2i , (57)
where si, ∀i, follows N(0, 1). Then, the random variable
S must follow the noncentral chi-square distribution with k
degrees of freedom and with η as the noncentral parameter.
As such, V and S are i.i.d. random variables. In the following,
we aim to prove that the random variable S can be well
approximated as a Gaussian random variable when the degree
of freedom k is small but the noncentral parameter η is
sufficiently large. To this end, we rearrange S as
S =
k∑
i=1
s2i + 2s1
√
η + η. (58)
We note that the term
∑k
i=1 s
2
i in (58) follows the (central)
chi-square distribution with mean k and variance 2k, and
2s1
√
η + η ∼ N(η, 4η). (59)
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We also note that, if k is small and η is large enough, the
distribution of the random variable S is dominated by the
Gaussian distribution. As such, the pdf of the noncentral chi-
square random variable S can be well approximated by the
Gaussian distribution N(k + η, 2k + 4η). This completes the
proof of Lemma 4. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Following Lemma 4, the random variable X [n] can be well
approximated as a Gaussian random variable with mean 2 +
λ[n] and variance 4+4λ[n]. According to Lemma 3, the mean
absolute deviation of the random variable X [n] is given by
2
√
2
π
√
λ[n] + 1. In addition, we note that g(X [n]) is a convex
function with respect to X [n] and limX[n]→∞
g(X[n])
X[n] = 0. As
such, following (22), an upper bound on EX[n] [g(X [n])] is
given by (60b), which is shown at the top of the previous page.
Considering that λ[n] is large, (60b) can be further simplified
into (60c). As such, a lower bound on the average minimum
total error rate ξ¯∗[n] is given by
ξ¯∗[n] ≥ 1− 1
2 ln (̺)
gu(λ[n], Pa[n]), (61)
where gu(λ[n], Pa[n]) is given in (60c). This completes the
proof of Proposition 1. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We first define f(x1, x2) , 1x1x2 , where x1 > 0 and x2 > 0.
The Hessian matrix of f(x1, x2) is given by
▽2f(x1, x2) =
1
x1x2
[
2
x21
1
x1x2
1
x1x2
2
x22
]
=
1
x1x2
[
1
x21
0
0 1
x22
]
+
1
x1x2
[ 1
x1
1
x2
] [
1
x1
1
x2
]  0. (62)
As such, f(x1, x2) is a convex function with respect to x1 and
x2 when x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. We note that a convex function is
lower bounded by its first-order approximation. Consequently,
for given feasible points x˜1 and x˜2, the following inequality
must hold
1
x1x2
≥ 1
x˜1x˜2
− (x1 − x˜1)
x˜2x˜21
− (x2 − x˜2)
x˜1x˜22
. (63)
We note that the term
Pa[n]γ0
2Rb[n]−1
can be rearranged as
γ0
(Pa[n])−1(2Rb[n]−1)
. According to (62), it is easy to verify that
γ0
(Pa[n])−1(2Rb[n]−1)
is jointly convex with respect to (Pa[n])
−1
and 2Rb[n] − 1. As such, replacing x1, x2, x˜1, and x˜2 in
(63) with (Pa[n])
−1, 2Rb[n] − 1, (P˜a[n])−1, and 2R˜b[n] − 1,
respectively, we can obtain the inequality (34). This completes
the proof of Lemma 6. 
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
We first define f(x1, x2) ,
√
x1x2, where x1 > 0 and
x2 > 0. The Hessian matrix of f(x1, x2) is given by
▽2f(x1, x2) = −1
4
√
x1x2
[ 1
x1
−1
x2
] [
1
x1
−1
x2
]  0. (64)
As such, f(x1, x2) is jointly concave with respect to x1 and
x2 when x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. We recall that the first-
order approximation of any concave function is its upper
bound. Consequently, for given feasible points x˜1 and x˜2, the
following inequality must hold
√
x1x2 ≤
√
x˜1x˜2+
(x1 − x˜1)
2
√
x˜2
x˜1
+
(x2 − x˜2)
2
√
x˜1
x˜2
. (65)
We note that 1
ε2w
‖qa[n] − qˆw‖2 + 1 > 0 and u1[n] > 0
must hold. Following (64),
√(
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2 + 1
)
u1[n] is
jointly concave with respect to 1
ε2w
‖qa[n]−qˆw‖2+1 and u1[n].
Replacing x1, x2, x˜1, and x˜2 in (65) with
1
ε2w
‖qa[n]− qˆw‖2+
1, u1[n],
1
ε2w
‖q˜a[n] − qˆw‖2 + 1, and u˜1[n], respectively, we
can obtain the inequality (41). This completes the proof of
Lemma 7. 
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